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relevance of each, the court was able to consider all appropriate
facets of sameness. The Currie analysis focuses attention on the
principles underlying the double jeopardy prohibition and the
competing policies in a given factual situation. This emphasis
provides a generally applicable analytical framework, assures
that fundamental policy objectives will be considered, and may
enhance the predictability of results.
Corporations: Dominant Shareholder in Close
Corporation Allowed To Vote Without Regard to
Interests of the Corporation
Complainant, a director and stockholder in a close family
corporation, challenged a vote of the majority stockholders re-
fusing shares offered to the corporation pursuant to a first option
provision.' Complainant's stepmother, a second director, con-
trolled the corporation by virtue of a life interest in approximately
80 percent of the outstanding stock. Upon her death the shares
barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) . . . the subsequent prosecution is for:
(c) the same conduct, unless (i) the offense of which the defendant
was formerly convicted or subsequently prosecuted each requires proof
of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such
offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil
Under § 1.07, arguably the offense of reckless driving is included within the
charge of atrocious assault because it could be established by proof of the
facts "required to establish" the atrocious assault. Here, just as in the same
evidence test, however, difficulty lies in determining which facts are required
to establish the including offense. See note 7 supra. Depending on the view
chosen as to required proof, opposite results could be reached.
Assuming both offenses were committed by the same conduct, § 1.09
would bar the atrocious assault prosecution unless each offense "requires proof
of a fact not required by the other." Here again opposite results can be
reached depending on how the evidentiary problems noted above and in note
7 supra are resolved.
1. The option provided that any shareholder desiring to sell stock must
first offer it to the corporation which may then purchase within one month
from the time of the offer. Boss v. Boss, 200 A.2d 231, 23 (R.I. 1964). Such
provisions are universally held to be for the benefit of the corporation and
therefore valid. See 48 Mminx. L. REV. 808 (1964). First options are designed
to allow the original shareholders to control the entry of new shareholders
and to protect their proportionate interest in the corporation. For extensive
discussion of first option provisions, see 2 O'NEAL, CLosE CORPORATIONS H§
7.02-.29 (1958).
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were to be divided equally between the complainant and his half
brother, the remaining director. The refusal permitted the half
brother to complete his purchase of a small number of shares,
which at his mother's death would give him majority control.2
The court below, solely on the basis of the pleadings, set aside
the vote of the majority, finding it contrary to the interests of
the corporation. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
did not review the lower court's determination, but by reversing,
held in effect that the dominant stockholder could vote in her
own interest irrespective of the interests of the corporation. Boss
v. Boss, 200 A.2d 231 (R.I. 1964). This Comment is concerned
with the basis upon which the case was decided and its necessary
implications; the actual transaction is not evaluated.
When action taken by the majority shareholders is challenged
as contrary to the interests of the corporation or the minority
shareholders, the court's decision may very well be based upon
the adoption of one of two seemingly contradictory views. The
popular view, supported by the older cases3 and the general re-
luctance of the judiciary to interfere in corporate management,.
is that stockholders may vote in their own interest without regard
2. The corporation had only 71 shares outstanding. Complainant held
three shares and had a remainder interest in 30. His half brother held two
shares and also had a remainder interest in 30. The remaining six shares,
including the four in controversy, were held by an outsider. Had there been
no refusal, complainant would have had one more share than his half brother,
and thus would have been in a more commanding position. 200 A.9d at 232-33.
The lower court found that it was the intention of the corporation's founder
in devising the stock to the respective parties that ultimate control should
vest in the complainant, his son. Brief for Complainant, pp. 40, 41, Boss v.
Boss, 200 A.2d 231 (1964).
3. E.g., Du Pont v. Du Pont, 251 Fed. 937 (D. Del. 1918), aff'd except as
to costs, 256 Fed. 129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 642 (1919); Haldeman
v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376 (1917); Albert E. Touchet, Inc. v.
Touchet, 264 Mass. 499, 163 N.E. 184 (1928); Bjorngaard v. Goodhue County
Bank, 49 Minn. 483, 52 N.W. 48 (1892); Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
64 N.J. Eq. 673, 53 Atl. 842 (Ch. 1903); White v. Kincaid, 149 N.C. 415, 63
S.E. 109 (1908). See also 13 Am. Jum. Corporations §§ 489, 997 (1938).
4. This reluctance is predicated on the democratic belief in deferring to
the majority - in the case of the corporation, a rule of the majority in interest.
See Du Pont v. Du Pont, 256 Fed. 129, 184 (3d Cir. 1919); Kentucky Package
Store, Inc. v. Checani, 331 Mass. 125, 128, 117 N.E.2d 139, 141 (1954); BERLE
& MEANs, TnE MODERN CoRPoRATIoN AiD PRiVATE PRoPERTY 121 (1932);
Sneed, Stockholders Votes Motivated by Adverse Interest: The Attack and the
Defense, 58 Mica. L. REV. 961, 966 (1960); Sneed, The Factors Affecting the
Validity of Stockholder Votes in Adverse Interest, 13 OKLA. L. REV. 373, 375
(1960).
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to the interests of the corporation.' In Gamble v. Queens County
Water Co.' a stockholder-director voted his stock to confirm a
sale which he had previously made to the corporation. The New
York Court of Appeals held that the stockholder was in no sense
a trustee and had a right to vote in his own interest, even though
that interest was entirely separate from the interests of the other
stockholders.7
Representative of the opposite position is Lebold v. Inland
Steel Co.,' in which the majority shareholders voted to dissolve
5. The "self-interest principle" is no more than a presumption that what
is good for the majority must also be good for the corporation. Memphis &
C.C.R.R. v. Wood, 88 Ala. 630, 644, 7 So. 108, 113 (1889). Since individuals
generally enter business to make a profit, those having the largest investment
will be the most diligent in seeing that their investment is maximized. Con-
versely, they will not vote to injure the business entity for this would only
jeopardize their own investment. Sneed, The Stockholder May Vote as He
Pleases: Theory and Fact, 22 U. Pirr. L. REV. 23, 25 (1960). The profit incen-
tive which provided a basis for the "self-interest principle" has also led to
the development of other propositions which buttress the shareholder's freedom
to vote. Thus it has been held that the stockholder owes no fiduciary duty
to his fellow shareholders. E.g., Price v. Holcomb, 89 Iowa 123, 56 N.W. 407
(1893); Meriman v. National Zinc Corp., 82 N.J. Eq. 493, 89 Atl. 764 (Ch.
1914). Allied with this proposition is the contention that an adverse interest
will not disqualify a shareholder from voting. Kentucky Package Store, Inc.
v. Checani, 831 Mass. 125, 117 N.E.2d 139 (1954); United States Steel Corp.
v. Hodge, 64 N.J. Eq. 807, 54 Atl. 1 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903); Thurmond v.
Paragon Colliery Co., 82 W. Va. 49, 95 S.E. 816 (1918). The latter assertion is
based on the conception that the right to vote is a property right inhering
in the ownership of shares and, as such, is beyond the control of the other
shareholders. Kentucky Package Store, Inc. v. Checani, supra. Some courts
indulge in a presumption that majority action was fair. Porges v. Vadsco Sales
Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (Ch. 1943); Cole v. National Cash Credit
Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 Atl. 183 (Ch. 1931). The presumption is probably a
result of the assumed identity of interest between the majority and the
corporation, but it is also a rule of judicial convenience designed to relieve
the court of the difficult problem of examining many varied and complex
corporate transactions. Sneed, supra at 42.
6. 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890).
7. Id. at 97, 25 N.E. at 202.
8. 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942); accord, Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254
U.S. 590 (1921); Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); Sea-
grave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954); Lebold v. Inland S.S., 82
F2d 351 (7th Cir. 1936); Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 Fed.
529, 537 (6th Cir. 1915); Franklin v. Havalena Mining Co., 16 Aris. 200, 141
Pac. 727 (1914); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d
236 (Ch. 1953); Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 261, 106 N.E.2d
848 (1952).
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a successful subsidiary solely to deprive the minority of the op-
portunity to share in the subsidiary's profits. The Seventh Cir-
cuit, emphasizing the fact that the majority controlled 80 percent
of the subsidiary's stock and actually managed all its affairs,
stated that because of their dominant position they owed the
same fiduciary obligation to the corporation and the minority as
would directors exercising similar managerial functions.o In a
distinguishable context the United States Supreme Court has
stated that dominant or controlling shareholders hold their power
to control in trust for the benefit of the corporation and the re-
maining shareholders.'
Taken out of context, Gamble requires the conclusion that a
shareholder may vote as he pleases no matter how oppressive the
result. On closer analysis the "self-interest principle" may have
been employed in that case merely to buttress a previous finding
that the action taken by the majority was "not unfair"" or that
the interested stockholder's vote did not determine the result. 2
The defendant's vote in Gamble was not needed to constitute a
majority, 5 and although he received a premium for the sale, the
9. 125 F.2d at 872.
10. Pepper v. Litton, 808 U.S. 295 (1989). The case involved a fraudulent
scheme engineered by the dominant shareholder of a bankrupt corporation
to use the bankruptcy proceeding as a device to deprive a creditor of his
claim while at the same time enabling the shareholder to reap a tremendous
profit.
11. Fairness, as applied in these cases, does not refer to an abstract con-
cept of justice, but to an analysis of what is not unfair in light of the prevail-
ing business mores. Given the proposition that the majority should be free
to manage with minimal interference, fairness is essentially a determination
that some inference of business purpose can be drawn. See Sneed, The Stock-
holder May Vote as He Pleases: Theory and Fact, 22 U. Pir. L. REV. 28, 8S
(1960). It presupposes a negative analysis which is only meaningful in light
of the situations in which courts have found the majority's action unfair.
Moreover such an analysis of the result precludes an examination of the motive
prompting the action, since the only relevant object of inquiry is whether
the act was within the business discretion of the stockholders. Ervin v. Oregon
Ry. & Nay. Co., 20 Fed. 577, 580 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884); Kirwan v. Parkway
Distillery Inc., 285 Ky. 605, 611, 148 S.W.2d 720, 723 (1942); White v. Kin-
caid, 149 N.C. 415, 420, 68 S.E. 109, 111 (1908). Recent cases generally speak
solely in terms of fairness. In Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667
(8th Cir. 1962), the court sustained a recapitalization plan whereby the voting
shareholders gave the nonvoting shareholders a right to vote in return for a
$2,000,000 increase in the former's share in the equity. The court based its
decision solely on the finding that the plan was fair. 809 F.2d at 671-72.
12. See, e.g., Du Pont v. Du Pont, 256 Fed. 129 (8d Cir.), cert. denied,
250 U.S. 642 (1919). If the challenged vote was not needed to constitute a
majority, then the self-interest of the shareholder becomes immaterial.
13. 123 N.Y. at 97, 25 NE. at 202.
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court found that under the circumstances the transaction was
justifiable. Moreover, if the majority's vote were sufficiently
detrimental to suggest that their interest lay wholly outside the
interests of the corporation, the court indicated it would not hesi-
tate to interfere. 5 Therefore, Gamble does not speak to the ques-
tion of a dominant shareholder's duty to the corporation and
minority shareholders. Nevertheless, cases adopting the principle
established in Gamble do emphasize the fact that courts are
reluctant to impose their conception of management policies on
a corporation if it is not unreasonable to presume that the stock-
holders' desire to maximize their investment will lead them to
pursue the most profitable course for the corporation.' Such ju-
dicial tradition deserves continued respect, but it has no applica-
tion when a dominant shareholder's vote bears no relation to the
interests of the corporate whole. When such a finding is made,
interference by the court in corporate affairs is desirable.
The apparent inconsistency between the cases imposing fidu-
ciary duties and those which refuse to do so may be explained,
in part, by an analysis of the respective factual contexts. The
validity of the self-interest principle depends upon drawing a
distinction between managerial functions and ownership.'8 The
mere ownership of stock does not impose a fiduciary obligation.
It is only where majority shareholders actually undertake to
manage the corporation's affairs or are in a position of dominance
that a duty of trust will be imposed.' Thus in Gamble, although
14. Id. at 104-05, 25 N.E. at 204.
15. Id. at 99, 25 N.E. at 202.
16. See note 5 supra.
17. Soderstrom v. Kingsholm Baking Co., 189 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951);
Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 42 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1941), modified, 146
F.2d 889 (Sd Cir. 1944); Brown v. Dolese, 39 Del. Ch. 1, 157 A.2d 784 (Ch.
1961); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (Ch. 1943);
Cole v. Wells, 224 Mass. 504, 113 N.E. 189 (1916); see cases cited note 8 supra.
18. This distinction is characterized in 3 FLETCHER, PRIvATE CORPORATIONS
§ 983 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1947): "A stockholder-director is not deprived of
his right to vote on any matter properly coming before a stockbholders'
meeting, on account of any private interest he may have which is detrimental
to the corporation." See also BERLE & MAS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 119-25.
19. Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 261, 106 N.E.2d 848 (1952);
Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942).
In general the management of the corporation is left to the directors. The
director's duty of loyalty will not allow him to prefer his own interest to
that of his cestuis and will subject him to the highest standard of good faith.
E.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Irving Trust
Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934); Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp.
64 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 909 (1952); see 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 18, § 838 and cases
cited therein.
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the defendant was a director as well as a shareholder, it was
unnecessary to impose restrictions upon him as a shareholder
because he had no management power in that capacity - no
controlling interest. On the other hand, in Lebold the majority
shareholders also constituted a majority of the directors; in
either capacity they were able to manage the corporation.
Sometimes a dominant management-ownership group will
have an interest in conflict with the corporation as a whole. If
such a management group can act in its alter ego as owners and
thereby avoid its managerial responsibilities, the position of the
minority becomes precarious. Without judicial limitations prop-
erty which the minority entrusted to the majority is subject not
to the latter's managerial ability, but to its unlimited personal
discretion.2 0 Where domination is shown, all managers, whether
acting as owners, directors, or officers, should be subject to the
obligations necessary to protect the property of those for whom
they manageY'
20. It is fundamental that one who takes stock, does so with full knowledge
that he takes it subject to the power of the majority. J. H. Lane & Co. v.
Maple Cotton Mills, 226 Fed. 692 (4th Cir. 1915). Nevertheless, the recogni-
tion of the majority's power to manage is precisely the reason he is burdened
with fiduciary obligations since the minority has no alternative but to act
through the majority. Wheeler v. Abilene Nat'l Bank Bldg. Co., 159 Fed.
891, 394 (8th Cir. 1908); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y.
185, 194-95, 128 N.E. 148, 151 (1919).
21. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919), Mr. Justice
Brandeis aptly stated the obligation owing to the minority: "The majority
has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation
toward the minority, as much so as the corporation itself or its officers and
directors." 250 U.S. at 487-88.
Akin to cases imposing restrictions on shareholders who vote contrary to
the corporate interest are cases which impose limitations upon shareholders
selling "control." One court has allowed the corporation to recover from the
seller a premium received, apparently on the ground that the shareholder
usurped a corporate opportunity. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, cert.
denied, 349, U.S. 952 (1955). Courts seem more willing to impose responsi-
bilities on stockholders who sell under circumstances which indicate the seller
should have known or foreseen that the buyer would subsequently loot the
corporation. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22
(E.D. Pa. 1940); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941). In
Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942),
the court determined that the seller had no knowledge or reason to know that
the buyer intended to loot the corporation. The corporation involved in Levy
was a manufacturing concern whereas the cases imposing liability involved
corporations with a substantial percentage of liquid assets. In the latter situa-
tion the possibility of looting is probably more foreseeable. For extensive
treatment of the problem of control see Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate
750
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Unfortunately, the severity of the limitation imposed upon a
dominant group's freedom to act in its own interest has seemed
to depend upon the type of transaction challenged. Where the
operating assets of the corporation may be adversely affected or
the proprietary interest of the minority impaired, a fairly rigid
standard has been required?2 On the other hand, if the challenged
transaction has only peripheral effect, the standard has been
relaxed in order to preserve the manager's business discretion?"
In either situation dominance, not the nature of the transaction,
should be the crucial factor.
In the instant case the court did not determine whether the
majority's vote was contrary to the corporate interest, fair, or
in good faith. By allowing the dominant shareholder to vote in
her own interest without an examination of the surrounding cir-
cumstances and result, the court placed all shareholder action
beyond the scope of judicial review. The result leaves the minority
shareholders totally unprotected. The majority vote in Boss may
have been fair, but the court refused to adopt a fairness standard,
relying instead on the formal distinction between directors and
stockholders. The stepmother's pervasive control of the corpora-
tion is precisely the dominance which the Lebold case found to
impose a fiduciary duty 24 The determination by the court that
a dominant shareholder may, as a matter of law, vote his stock
in his own self-interest, irrespective of the corporate interest, is
indefensible and should not be followed.
Control, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 22 (1963); Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58
CoLutm. L. REv. 1912 (1958); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv.
L. REV. 986 (1957); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CAL. L. REV.
1 (1956); Note, 44 IowA L. REv. 734 (1959).
22. See cases cited note 8 supra. While the Lebold case is easily distin-
guishable from the factual situation in Boss-in Lebold the majority sought
to completely eliminate the corporation whereas in Boss the effect on the
corporation was peripheral at best-Lebold indicates that it is the fact of
dominance rather than the transaction which imposes the duty. 195 F.2d
at 372.
23. E.g., Du Pont v. Du Pont, 256 Fed. 129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 250
U.S. 642 (1919); Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (Sup. Ct.
1956).
24. The question of the exercise of the option was first brought before a
directors' meeting. Since the half brother could not vote because of his interest
in the shares, the stepmother voted against the exercise of the option thereby
creating a stalemate and forcing the question to the stockholders' meeting
where she could then vote her majority against the option. She apparently
contended that a fiduciary duty was not applicable to her outside of the
directors' meeting. See 200 A.2d at 234.
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